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This is an exercise in what, for the purposes of this essay, I will 
call social pragmatism – a philosophical approach that I am 
drawing out of Robert Brandom’s neo-Hegelian revision of 
pragmatism.1 Most generally one might see such an approach as 
uniting phenomenology with idealism by anchoring both on a 
pragmatist basis. The paper focuses on the social constitution of 
meaning, conceptual content and value, that is; it focuses on the 
social constitution of normativity,2 but also holds that such 
constitution is not arbitrary, or completely relative. Natural 
conditions constrain such social constitution yet do so without 
completely determining it. The normative flows out of an 
interaction with the world, but this interaction is free in that whilst 
the world itself certainly binds beliefs and actions it does not 
completely determine such beliefs and actions. I will refer to this 
constitution of normativity as free, not in the negative sense of 
the word freedom, as freedom from constraint, but in the positive 
                                                
1 For Brandom’s reading of Hegel see: Robert Brandom, Tales of the Mighty 
Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality, Cambridge, 2002; 
and ‘Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading of Hegel: Comparing Empirical 
and Logical Concepts’ in Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen 
Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism, Vol 3, 2005; Deutscher 
Idealismus und die analytische Philosophie der Gegenwart/German Idealism 
and Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, Karl Ameriks editor, 131-161; ‘Some 
Pragmatist Themes in Hegel's Idealism: Negotiation and Administration in 
Hegel's Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual Norms,’ European 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 7 (2), 1999, 164-189. 
2 To quote from Stephen Darwall: 'Something is said by philosophers to have 
"normativity" when it entails that some action, attitude or mental state of some 
other kind is justified, an action one ought to do or a state one ought to be in. 
Stephen Darwall, ‘Normativity’ in Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 
London, 2001, [cited 30/6/06]. Available from 
 http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L135. 
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sense of the word which indicates a capacity to choose, or 
determine for oneself, the rules or maxims through which one 
acts. Nature provides a context for belief and action yet leaves 
us under-determined as to what we will believe and which 
actions we will perform, our natural context conditions but does 
not determine normativity. This leaves us free to determine for 
ourselves the norms that underwrite our responses to the world. 
Thus the key line of thinking presented in this paper is that whilst 
normativity is socially constituted and in a sense freely 
constituted, this freedom is not completely unconstrained but 
rather takes its leave from the kinds of natural constraints that 
serve as a context for the expression of those norms. 
 
The main methodological tool that this approach offers the study 
of religion is the idea that normativity, and the ‘nature’ that is 
orientated by it, are mutually informative and mutually 
transformative. The normative and the natural interpenetrate, 
there is reciprocity between them. Further, this helps us to think 
through the relation between culture and nature in a way that 
sees culture as arising out of nature, but irreducible to the kind of 
linear causation through which the natural realm is understood 
by science. Social-pragmatism firstly allows us to give an 
account of the social constitution of value and meaning that can 
neither be reduced to a naturalistic account nor lead to cultural 
relativism. That is, it allows us to take culture seriously without 
committing the ‘anthropologist’s fallacy.’3 Secondly it allows us to 
be non-reductive naturalists, to hold that there is nothing outside 
of the frame of nature but that there is a dimension of life that 
                                                
3 The idea that culture or cultural beliefs determine the facts of the world so that 
if a culture believed that the earth was flat then, for that culture, the earth would 
be flat. This notion leaves beliefs completely unconstrained by anything but the 
system of beliefs of which they are a part. On such a view the world itself has 
no impact on what is believed. Thus for a culture that believes the world is flat 
there could be no ‘experiential evidence’ which might count against that belief. 
Such a position is one-sided and might be thought of as the culturally relativistic 
reflex of what I will call the empiricists fallacy; the thought that empirical 
experience gives us direct access to a world of fact. 
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naturalistic sciences can never account for or can never be 
accounted for under the kind of linear causality that 
predominates in the natural sciences – it allows us to be 
naturalists without being led to scientism.  
 
Most particularly this paper is a social-pragmatist account of 
Hegel’s early development of a theory of Geist or Spirit. This 
term, Geist is a Hegelian term of art for culture in its most broad 
sense, Geist or Spirit refers to all institutions written and 
unwritten within a culture, or more comprehensively within 
human life. More straightforwardly we could say, along with 
Habermas, that Geist refers to the normative in general.4 As such 
reference to the spiritual is a reference to the normative; 
correspondingly talk of normativity is talk of Hegelian Spirit.5 This 
places us firmly within the non-metaphysical reading now 
common, though perhaps still somewhat controversial, in Anglo-
American Hegel scholarship.6 In this view, Geist arises with 
intersubjectivity; Geist has intersubjectivity as its ground and 
could not exist outside of it.7 There are three levels at which 
normativity is intersubjectively constituted; socially, inferentially 
and historically.8 In this paper the focus will be on the social and 
historical, leaving the logical issues for another day. 
 
Normativity is most commonly contrasted with the natural. The 
natural comprises actual states of affairs. For instance: the cat is 
on the mat. This is a naturalistic description – two objects in a 
spatial relation. The normative relates to issues of both meaning 
(semantics)9 and value (axiology and ethics)10 and orientates us 
                                                
4 Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, Boston, 1973, 146. 
5 Robert Brandom, Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the 
Metaphysics of Intentionality, Cambridge, 2002, 47-8. 
6 Here I would refer the reader to Robert Pippin, Robert Williams, Terry Pinkard, 
Robert Brandom and for we in the antipodes Paul Redding. 
7 Habermas, op cit, 146. 
8 Brandom, op cit, 47-8. 
9 Darwall, op cit, http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L135SECT6. 
10 Ibid, http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L135SECT2.  
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on what we ought do. Human cultural life is normative, a web-
work of values and meanings orientating us firstly to the world, 
providing a hermeneutic; and secondly to what we ought to do in 
it. Some approaches to philosophy tend to dichotomise this 
distinction. Many philosophers who take this view see the natural 
is something with cognitive import, that is, we can stand in 
objective epistemic relation to it. But by adopting such a position 
the normative seems to be reduced, to mirror Hume, to a blanket 
that humans arbitrarily throw over a world of fact.11 Thus 
contemporary philosophy has at times, and somewhat ironically, 
come to value facts over values or norms. 
 
Further, naturalistic accounts use natural causal laws as their 
explanatory tool. These laws are such that we do not have a 
choice about conforming to them; I do not choose whether 
drinking a glass of sulphuric acid kills me. The causal 
explanations invoked in naturalistic accounts are determinative; 
they determine what happens with necessity. The second law of 
thermodynamics, a law which governs heat transference, is not 
something that we are at liberty to resist, it is simply operative. 
On the other hand normative accounts of human phenomena 
invoke socially engendered norms (concepts, beliefs, meanings 
and values) to account for agential actions. One might say – it is 
correct, to place the wine glass on the right hand side of the 
plate, above the knife. This expresses a cultural norm, it tells us 
what we ought to do, and the actions of agents that express this 
norm (the setting of tables) are assessable in normative terms. 
We might say of a setting that conforms to this norm that it is 
‘well set’, or one that does not so conform could be assessed as 
‘poorly set’. Norms are a matter of how culture orientates us to 
the world but we are at liberty to resist. The normative realm is 
indeterminative, it does not determine what we do. Rather it 
guides or orientates us, so that whether I respond to a norm is 
contingent.  
 
                                                
11 Ibid, http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L135.  
Philip A Quadrio 
 
99 
This distinction is structured by and helps to structure another 
distinction, that between the theoretical and the practical. In 
philosophy the theoretical relates to an explanatory engagement 
with states of affairs; it offers objective third person descriptions. 
As such it coheres with the scientific world view and has all the 
prestige of science. The practical relates to the normative 
sphere. Here discourse aims to tell us what we ought to do, how 
we ought to take things, what is valued or seen as good. But 
because the factual is privileged, much of this is cashed out in 
factual terms; hence normative ethics is reduced to giving an 
account of human moral orientation that can be inferred from 
facts. This already points up a problem with the fact/value 
dichotomy. Lastly this distinction maps onto that between nature 
and nurture, or genes and environment. Do we account for 
human behaviour biologically, or in terms of the cultural and 
environmental influences that shape the normative life of agents?  
Current wisdom favours the natural; human behaviour is 
accounted for in terms of biological imperatives, drives, desires 
and passions. 
 
Because normativity is generated intersubjectively12 or socially, 
to speak of a society is to speak of an already constituted 
normativity. This makes it look as if the individual is powerless 
against the normative. Further, we do not choose to enter social 
space nor what social space we enter, we just find ourselves in 
some preconstituted society, replete with norms. Such concerns 
can be addressed. Qua social member I play my part in 
constituting the normative. I affirm or reject norms by my actions 
– the way I act expresses my relation to them. But I will be held 
responsible to those norms by other social members.13 They can 
assess the way I respond to such norms and they can express 
that assessment in their interactions with me. I am not powerless 
against the normative, but it is a standard against which I will be 
                                                
12 Habermas, op cit, 146. 
13 Robert Brandom, ‘Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel’s Idealism,’ in 
European Journal of Philosophy, 1999, 7 (2), 180-182.  
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evaluated by other social players.14 My culture or society might 
view a certain action as wrong or sinful, it is up to me whether or 
not I commit that action, but it is not up to me to decide whether I 
have or have not sinned – that authority lies with the community 
of which I am a part. I, qua subject, am not an independent 
authority that can determine by pure self-legislation what does or 
does not constitute a sin. I only have conceptual grasp of this 
norm through a process of socialisation.15 I can try to challenge 
the norm through my behaviour, I might, through my actions, try 
to demonstrate that something that is seen as sinful is not, but 
whether or not this is successful depends on the reception of the 
community. Thus norms can be resisted, we are not completely 
determined by the normative, but it we do not get to choose how 
that resistance will be evaluated or assessed by other members 
of our community. 
 
Further the process of acculturation that we undergo is a process 
of orientating us to the norms of our life-world; acculturation is a 
process of internalising values and meanings. This is something 
that happens socially. It requires others; it is an intersubjective 
process. The normative life of our community helps to form us, 
but we are not so embedded in that form of life that we cannot 
register tensions and inconsistencies within its norms. In so far 
as we can do this we can help in the process of reforming our 
norms. In so far as we see certain norms as good, or correct, we 
acquiesce in their goodness or correctness, they pass over into 
customary life. Yet, this does not mean that we cannot assess 
certain norms negatively; as pejorative, or ineffectual and so on. 
In so far as we can negatively assess our own normative life we 
can challenge the norms by which we live; but whether our 
challenge to such norms is effective, whether it is sufficient to 
bring about normative revision, is not up to us but is rather up to 
the community in which we live.16 If our challenge is effective 
                                                
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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then we help to reorientate our community on that value. If our 
challenge is not successful than the norm holds firm and we are 
seen as perverse for challenging it. We are both the authors of 
and authored by our norms. 
 
An influential feature of Hegelian thought is that it breaks down 
the distinction between norm and nature. They become two sides 
of one coin. The normative is second nature; arising out of, but 
not reducible to, first nature. Culture is natural; it has the natural 
as its precondition. But the normative transcends the natural 
because the normative cannot be reduced to a description of 
states of affairs. Thus, as Pinkard points out, the mature Hegel 
tells us, in the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, 'For us, 
spirit has nature as its presupposition, and it is thereby its truth 
and its antecedent.'17 But, if there is continuity between the 
natural and the normative, then this implies that for Hegel the 
distinction between the normative and the natural is a normative 
one, a product of human culture, and being a normative 
distinction, it is one that we are not compelled to make, one that 
we can revise.  
 
This brings us to the Hegelian term Geist which, as I have said 
above, we can interpret as culture in its most broad sense; 
culture in this sense refers to all those aspects of the world that 
are dependent on human thinking, all rules and norms, written 
and unwritten. Geist has nature as its precondition,18 but 
transcends it; we have to make sense of the notion of nature 
transcending itself in Geist or culture. In order to do so we could 
take up the suggestion by Robert Williams that the existential 
genesis of Geist is the intersubjective act of reciprocal 
recognition.19 A suggestion leads us to a consideration of another 
piece of Hegelian theory; recognition theory. Geist emerges from 
a natural event, an interaction between two natural beings that 
                                                
17 Terry Pinkard, German Philosophy: 1760-1860 The Legacy of Idealism, 
Cambridge, 2002, 277. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Robert R Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition, Berkeley. 1997, 90-92. 
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naturally have the capacity to reciprocally accord each other a 
positive status. To speak of two beings as reciprocally 
recognising each other is to say that they are able to see or 
recognise the other, as sharing common features whilst not 
allowing this to over-ride otherness or difference.20 You are like 
me, yet not me, and as such I transcend the perspective of 
subjectivity, captured by the first person singular pronoun ‘I’, and 
move to the perspective of intersubjectivity, captured by the 
plural pronoun ‘We.’21 This cannot be described through an 
account of states of affairs, which would only have recourse to: A 
meets B. Such a description cannot capture what passes 
between subject A and B. What passes between them is spiritual 
in the Hegelian sense. In recognising you as being like myself, I 
recognise that I ought to ascribe to you certain features that I 
find in myself, and so come to see us as having something in 
common; the mere act of recognition brings a norm. In 
recognition, subjectivity completes itself, transcends itself, by 
passing over into intersubjectivity.22 This is a natural relation 
between natural beings, but it is the existential genesis of Spirit; 
normativity. In this moment the first norm emerges, in that I 
recognise you, I feel that I ought to accord you some positive 
status; thus in this minimal act, the whole field of ethics opens 
up. We reach the threshold of the ethical when the other comes 
to count and in the act of recognition the other comes to count 
ethically. 
 
If we understand Geist correctly then we will understand that all 
human institutions, written and unwritten, all laws, all customs, all 
duties, all systems of meaning, all language is normative. Now if 
Geist is just a way of referring to the normative then it seems as 
if, to borrow from Pippin, we have left nature behind and are 
entering a world of pure thought. For on Pippin’s reading the 
Hegelian trajectory is away from nature and towards Spirit or 
                                                
20 Ibid, 79-81. 
21 Ibid, 82-3. 
22 Ibid, 116-118. 
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Geist.23 But the very locution 'away from "nature" and "towards" 
"Spirit," Geist…'24 seems to indicate that there is something non-
natural about Spirit. It seems to suggest that Spirit ‘transcends’ 
nature and such transcendence of nature seems to imply a break 
with nature. Of course, as is well known, Hegel sees Geist as a 
sublation or Aufhebung25 of nature. But the term sublation implies 
that what is sublated, nature, is preserved within that which 
sublates it, Geist.26 The term sublation never implies a breach. 
Thus Geist develops out of nature, whilst preserving nature, and 
does not leave it behind. Geist is a modification of nature. Pippin 
is aware that, for Hegel, Geist is a modification or development 
of nature (it is something that must be acquired through a 
process of socialisation). In fact Pippin himself evokes the 
metaphor of the tended garden. He contrasts untended 
'biological'27 growth with the 'tended growth'28 of Geist suggesting 
that Geist is not merely the product of blind forces but a more 
complex kind of development. Despite understanding Geist as a 
development of nature, albeit a very complex one, Pippin seeks 
to understand Spirit in a way that views it as somehow leaving 
nature behind. Thus he urges us towards an understanding of 
their relation that sees the former transcending the latter in such 
a way as to open a gulf between them. In this authors opinion 
such an understanding distorts or conceals the preserving 
element in the Hegelian sublation. 
 
To try to capture the continuity between nature and Geist Hegel 
invokes a piece of Aristotelian terminology, the notion of 
                                                
23 Robert Pippin,  ‘Leaving Nature Behind Or Two Cheers for “Subjectivism,”’ in 
Nicholas H Smith, Reading McDowell: On Mind and World, New York, 2002, 
60. 
24 Loc cit. 
25 The German ‘Aufheben’ is a semantically rich concept and Hegel plays in this 
richness. It could be translated as; a) to raise or lift up, b) to cancel and c) to 
keep or preserve.  
26 Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary, Oxford, 1999, 283-5. 
27 Loc cit. 
28 Loc cit. 
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a'“second nature.'29 In entering the sphere of Geist we have not 
‘left nature behind’, rather we have stepped into Aristotelian 
second nature and - as already stated - this cannot be reduced 
to descriptive accounts of first nature, or states of affairs because 
such accounts can never capture what passes between subjects 
in an intersubjective or recognitive relation. To re-emphasise: 
whilst the normative, spiritual or cultural arises out of nature, it 
cannot be reduced to nature. We cannot have a purely 
naturalistic account of normativity. But that does not make it non-
natural. This opens the way for naturalists to be non-reductive 
naturalists, to see everything as natural yet refuse the idea of a 
naturalistic account of everything. 
 
This could be understood on empirical anthropological terms. By 
considering cultures with common ecological bases, but lacking 
historical or genetic connection and in circumstances that would 
count against diffusion, anthropologists have noted quite a deep 
normative resonance.30 Thus J H Steward offers us the insight 
that there might be an ecological basis for culture.31 This moves 
away from evolutionary and diffusionist32 accounts towards one 
that sees culture as expressing a human response to natural 
circumstance. Accordingly culture can be classified ecologically: 
‘desert nomad’ or ‘arctic hunting.’33 Following this work, Ake 
Hültkranz argued for an ecological basis for religion,34 types of 
religion can be deeply informed by the cultural type in which they 
are found. He envisages a taxonomic system whereby types of 
religion are described ecologically, allowing for comparisons 
between traditions with no geographical or historical relations, 
                                                
29 G W F Hegel Elements of the Philosophy of Right. translated by H B Nisbet, 
Cambridge, 1998, 35 (§4). 
30 Bruce Lincoln, Priests, Warriors and Cattle: a study in the ecology of religion, 
Berkeley, 1981, 6. 
31 Ibid, 10. 
32 Ibid, 6. 
33 Ibid, 10. 
34 Ibid, 9. 
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but which share a common ecology.35 This avoids evolutionism 
and diffusionism, as for Hültkranz, religion does not rely on 
evolutionary development, but rather is dependent on ecological 
conditions.36 In this view nature is the first context of culture. 
Culture does not arise within a vacuum, nor is it given from on 
high, it is authored; authorship requires a context and nature 
provides the first context of authorship. 
 
From my Hegelian perspective there are two interrelated 
problems with Hültkranz’s work. Firstly it is not dynamic; it paints 
a static picture. We might say history, as temporal process, is not 
paid its due. The temporal continuities and discontinuities 
between traditions in a community seems to have been 
sidelined. The normativity thesis tells us that we cannot simply 
abandon one set of norms in favour of another: but culture 
certainly changes; it is dynamic. A change in norms will reflect a 
change in circumstance and orientation. Further the norms that 
we held to before the change in circumstance and orientation are 
the ground of new norms, they grow out of a relation to older 
norms: extension, rejection, revaluation and so forth. This is a 
dynamic process, a process in which we are embedded, a 
process that we as social creatures author, but which reciprocally 
helps to author us. Secondly it does not take account of the 
implicit freedom of the normative realm, the institution of norms is 
the spontaneous response of a group to actual circumstances in 
which it finds itself. But the exact nature of their response cannot 
be seen as completely determined by those circumstances, 
because there will be a number of possible responses to any 
particular circumstance. The facts by themselves do not 
determine how we respond to them. Whilst ecology and natural 
circumstances provide a context for the development of culture, 
and circumscribe limits to culture, this does not result in any strict 
causal determination. Rather it leaves culture ‘underdetermined’ 
in terms of its response to its circumstances. 
                                                
35 Ibid, 10. 
36 Ibid.  
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Nature has set us up in a certain way. We are limited by a whole 
range of natural facts. This we share with our animal friends. But 
there is something peculiar about us, our capacity for reflection 
leads us to acknowledge that there are a variety of ways in which 
a certain need could be satisfied. The need is natural, but the 
need does not come complete with instructions for realising it, so 
that it is up to us and the circumstances we are in. It is because 
we are caught between natural determinacy, our needs are 
dictated, and normative indeterminacy, there are multiple ways of 
realising them, that the possibility that norms could be 
spontaneously generated arises. We have determinate needs, 
but how we satisfy those needs is indeterminate. Norms are 
generated when we start to favour certain modes of practice; 
when we realise that we have a better chance at catching cattle 
than birds, we start to favour the practice of catching cattle. 
Cattle catching becomes a social norm, it is how We survive. 
How we respond to our nature is never fully determined, even 
though the natural facts are. 
 
Hegel introduces the idea of cultural change, normative change, 
through the idea of a ‘perceived’ break with nature.37 Normative 
change does not have to come from something so dramatic. But 
this notion of a perceived break with nature is instructive for it 
does not imply any kind of metaphysical relation to nature rather 
it implies a changed hermeneutic that itself results from an 
interaction with nature or natural event. What is meant by the 
break with nature is that our environment all of a sudden 
presents itself to us in an unexpected guise,38 say a tsunami or a 
hurricane. This introduces new circumstances to respond to. 
Initially we must save ourselves, but after the initial shock we 
must come to terms with what has happened. We could relate to 
the weather in a different way. Further we might develop 
                                                
37 Henry S Harris, Hegel’s Development: Toward the Sunlight 1770-1801, 
Oxford, 1972, 272-5. 
38 Ibid, 274. 
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projects, such as building a sea wall to protect us. Thus our way 
of life, the way we understand ourselves, our culture generally, 
has been transformed. Perhaps we once earned a bounty from 
the sea and saw ourselves as those who partake in the sea’s 
bounties, but now it seems threatening, its meaning has 
changed. Now we win our bounty from a potentially hostile and 
destructive sea and so we view ourselves as those who struggle 
against the sea to win their bounty. Alternatively that break with 
nature could come through contact with other peoples with 
different norms. Culture is not a straight-jacket, nor is it static, 
with every change in circumstance we have something before us 
with the potential to drive us to normative revision.  
 
So far we have been discussing Hegel’s mature view but the title 
of this paper promises to say something about Hegel’s earliest 
writings and it is to this task that I shall now turn. The 
controversial claim I will make is that Hegel’s theory of Geist was 
largely in place by the mid 1790’s, that even then Geist is seen 
non-metaphysically, as arising with sociality and that the core of 
the theory was normativity. From the beginning the theory was, 
much like Hegel himself, focused on the social. So we can 
profitably read the early Hegel through a social-pragmatist lens. 
Less controversially the theory of Geist expresses the bringing 
together of streams of socio-political thought that have been with 
Hegel from his high school years, and which persist to shape his 
mature view. Firstly, the Aristotelian: quoting from Aristotle’s 
politics, that 'the polis arises from the needs of life but carries on 
for the sake of the good life.'39 Secondly, the Rousseauian notion 
that in the constitution of a ‘General Will’ we achieve autonomy in 
that my will is so deeply connected with the ‘General Will’ that I 
identify myself with it, it expresses my will.40 Aristotle is claiming 
that society is firstly natural, in arising from the needs of life it 
arises from natural facts, but secondly it is teleologically 
                                                
39 Aristotle, The Politics, translated by T A Sinclair, London, 1987, 28-30 (1252 
b1). 
40 J J Rousseau, The Social Contract, translated by M Cranston, 
Harmondsworth, 1968, 60-3. 
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orientated towards a social form that is valued, ‘the good life’. 
Hence it is orientated towards something of normative 
significance. How could Hegel connect this with Rousseau?  
Through the idea that something like a ‘General Will’ is 
constituted, if at times deficiently, through the recognitive 
relations that bind natural communities. From this perspective 
the ‘We’, the perspective of generality, already exists. Where 
groups of human beings think of themselves under the plural 
pronoun, then there collectivitity has already taken a self-
conscious form. 
 
Whilst Hegel’s understanding of Geist develops with his thinking, 
its outlines are present in his earliest writings. In the so-called 
Tübingen Fragment41 the term Geist is used by Hegel to describe 
the self-consciousness of a community, its capacity to be an 
object to itself through certain of its institutions.42 In particular the 
term Geist is used in reference to modalities of thought and 
action in which a community becomes conscious of its 
particularity qua community.43 Such institutions are orientated 
towards us, the ‘We’, they are evidence of the recognitive 
relations that already unify the community. In the Tübingen 
Fragment he tells us that the spirit of a people is the nexus of its 
history, religion and political life, each of these are modes of a 
people’s self-consciousness but none of them is sufficient to be 
regarded as that people’s Spirit, only the unity of the three.44 As 
Hegel tells us: 
 
 The [S]pirit of a people <is> its history, its religion, the level of 
 political freedom – [these things] cannot be treated separately 
 either with respect to their mutual influence, or in 
 characterising them [each by itself] – they are woven together 
 in a single bond – as when among three expert colleagues 
                                                
41 G W F Hegel, ‘The Tübingen Fragment of 1793,’ translated by H S Harris, In 
H S Harris, Towards the Sunlight, 481-507. 
42 Ibid 506. 
43 Ibid, 273. 
44 Ibid, 506. 
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 none can do anything without the others but each gets 
 something essential from the others…45  
 
Yet this is not a sufficient exposition of Hegel’s understanding of 
the concept of Geist even in 1793, for Hegel goes on to show 
these modalities of social self-consciousness are not only the 
product of the normative life of that society but also shape the 
normative life of that society.46 There is reciprocity between self-
understanding, the perspective we are given in these institutions, 
and lived existence, because our self-understanding orientates 
us to the meaning or significance of lived existence. But further, 
our self-understanding can fail to meet the demands of, or to be 
adequate to, lived experience, and so our self-understanding can 
need re-orientation based on that experience. If we take self-
understanding to be the normative node of the equation and our 
lived existence the natural node, then we can see that here we 
have reciprocity and community between the normative and the 
natural, they are almost in a communicative relation. They are 
mutually informative and mutually transformative – there is 
reciprocity. Hegel scholarship tells us that recognitive relations 
exist between members of a social group and their institutions.47 
In so far as an institution accords me some positive status, this is 
a mark that the community, of which I am a part, accords me a 
positive status. The institution recognises me, but in so far as I 
accord other social players the same status, I affirm, or 
recognise, the positive status of the institution. The three forms 
of community self-consciousness that Hegel focuses on in this 
essay are grounded in a normative system that they, qua 
discourses, help to articulate whilst themselves being shaped by 
that normative system. So it seems as if the Spirit of a people is 
not only its history, political structure and religion but also 
simultaneously orientates its particular historical, political and 
religious outlook. Spirit is a community’s modality of self-
                                                
45 Loc cit. 
46 Ibid 506-507. 
47 Willliams, op cit, 262-4. 
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consciousness, it is a way a community can think itself, but that 
form of thinking itself shapes what is thought.  
 
Hegel, during this early period sees himself as a social reformer. 
He is going to spread the ideals of the French revolution through 
central Europe in a non-violent, intellectual revolution. Hence, he 
views himself as someone engaged in the pursuit of normative 
reform. But he famously condemns utopian social reform – 
political theorists retreat into their studies, and think up ideal 
societies, ideal forms of life. Hegel thinks that these will fail 
unless they emerge from an understanding of the pre-existent 
form of life and can be seen as in dialogue with that form of life, 
to accord it some positive status, particularly reforms fail unless 
they can be seen by a people as its own product.48 A form of 
normativity cannot just be brushed aside, reform is not the 
institution of a vision but rather a transformative process of 
revision. So how ought reform take place? Well, Hegel suggests 
that we need to attend firstly to our form of life, the normative life 
that orientates us on the world; further, we have to understand 
how that form of life, those norms that orientate us, have 
developed with history.49 Norms, values and meanings, are 
historical entities, they emerge and develop in time, but our 
norms shape the way we relate to history, if we understand the 
trajectory through which a form of life has developed, this 
interplay between people and norms over time, then tensions 
and inconsistencies within the status quo are more readily 
registered.  
 
So for Hegel philosophers ought to turn their attention to the 
actual form of Spirit in which they live and find those aspects of 
its normative life that lie in conflict or tension with its own deepest 
orientating values. By thematising such tensions we can show 
how a form of life is inadequate to the actualisation of its deepest 
                                                
48 Susan Meld Shell, ‘Organizing the State: Transformations of the Body Politic 
in Rousseau Kant and Fichte,’ in International Yearbook of German Idealism, K 
Ameriks and J Stolzenberg, editors, Berlin, 2004, 58-9. 
49 Paul Franco, Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom, New Haven, 1999, 48. 
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values and in that way bring about a normative revision in 
accordance with its Spirit, that is, in accordance with its deepest 
orientating values. Specifically Hegel claims that the best way to 
do this is through religion. Religion plays a special role in human 
life. As we saw in the Tubingen fragment, it is our midwife, gently 
ushering us into a world replete with norms, but it is also our wet-
nurse, nourishing us through our vital social developmental 
phases, our acculturation. Religion nourishes us on the milk of 
normativity, it is a primary way of orientating ourselves to our 
world and to what we ought to do in it and so for Hegel if one 
wants to achieve lasting social reform one needs to work at 
religious reform. Reforming religion is, for Hegel, a way of 
bringing about broader normative reform, it’s his way of bringing 
the French revolution to Germany. 
 
What does all of this tell us about the study of religion?  Spirit is a 
system of norms that define our relation to the world by 
orientating our judgments about it and in doing so situates us in 
relation to that world. Norms that simultaneously orientate us to 
the world and to ourselves but which arose from natural 
creatures, with natural needs engaging with natural 
circumstances. One of the features of our normative life is 
religion. Religion is a response to the world, it helps us to find our 
way, it orientates us to the world and what we ought to do in it; it 
uses narratives, discourse, images and practices to orientate us 
to things of value, to uncover meanings, to bring us into social 
relations, but also gives us a way of understanding ourselves. 
Religion articulates the normative, it expresses the normative, 
and so it is a way for us to encounter our deepest values. In 
entering dialogue with our religious traditions we enter a dialogue 
with the norms that have shaped our form of life. At least this is 
the Hegelian social-pragmatist view, as from this perspective, 
religion, along with art and philosophy, is absolute Geist, it opens 
the normative up to us as something that we can view and 
dialogue with rather than just express. 
 
